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Strategic Insights: 2016 Campaign:
National Security Debate, Army
Implications, and Oversights
April 13, 2016 | Prof. William G. Braun, III

The United States finds itself in a presidential election year that will certainly result in
new priorities and policies. By the time this article is published, the world will know the
results of the March madness primary elections and caucuses. Currently, the nation is
choosing between two Democrat and three Republican candidates, with a real possibility
of having contested conventions in both parties come July.
National security policy and the employment of the nation’s Joint Force are perhaps
the most sacred responsibilities of the commander in chief, and a central theme in the
run-up to the July conventions. Army leaders are interested in the variance among the
candidates’ national security policy positions and their potential implications on land
forces.
It is incumbent on professional soldiers to consider the range of policy options
represented by the field of candidates, and their potential implications for the Army’s
future. Soldiers must first consider how the candidates, if elected president, intend to use
the Army. Senior Army leaders must also consider what the candidates are not debating.
Senior Army professionals must educate and advise candidates and policymakers on
overlooked challenges, and they must prepare the Army to meet those challenges in the
absence of guidance.
The candidates all consider the U.S. economy and U.S. commercial trade to be the
foundation of the nation’s strength and influence. Candidates put different spins on how
they would advance the U.S. economy and engage international trading partners.

However, the democratic front-runner’s assertion that “Our economy provides the
foundation for our leadership, our diplomatic influence, and our military might”1 would
not sound out of place in any candidate’s campaign speech.
With two notable exceptions, the candidates’ foreign policy philosophies embrace
international engagement and the expansion of Western values as critical U.S. interests.
Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are the two outliers to this observation. Trump’s
philosophy seems less concerned with expanding Western values than competing
successfully in international markets for economic competitive advantage. He believes he
can do this without intervention (or war). Bernie Sanders is the most isolationist
candidate, setting a very high bar for any U.S. intervention beyond diplomacy. Governor
John Kasich’s quote would resonate in the other campaigns and align with the general
trajectory of U.S. national security strategy since the Cold War.
. . . the U.S. can play a critical role in making the world more stable. We must rededicate
ourselves to the values that underpin and unite the Western world: democracy, a respect for
individual and civil liberties, a respect for human rights, a belief in the equality of men and
women, and a tolerance of different worldviews and religious beliefs.2

Despite this general philosophic alignment, as with each post-Cold War
administration, implementation strategies and the tools used to advance these
philosophies have varied. Examining the language used by the candidates regarding the
military and its role could offer a window into implementation policy and strategy
variance among the candidates.
There is a difference between how the parties address military issues. Both parties talk
about supporting the military and veterans. The Democrats quickly turn this
conversation toward U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs reform and caring for wounded
warriors. The conspicuous absence of a defense budget versus entitlement discussion
suggests the Budget Control Act (sequestration) restrictions will continue in a Democratic
administration. Among the Republican candidates defense budgets will likely increase.
Those with specific plans, particularly Senator Ted Cruz, support increased strategic
strike and high-end systems, including missile defense, satellite, and cyber capabilities.
No candidate is talking about adjusting Army end strength.
There are marginal differences between candidates regarding the military’s role in
foreign policy. The candidates all rattle off the same half-dozen threats likely to
precipitate a military action. Candidates in both parties indicate they will explore other
options first, holding direct military action as a last resort. Other consensus themes
include increased burden sharing by U.S. partners in all theaters, a regional Sunni force
to confront Daesh (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, and commitment of U.S. "unique capabilities"
to support those partners. The euphemism for "unique capabilities" universally means
Naval and Air strategic strike support. Republican candidates include Special Operations

advisors and Army Security Force Assistance trainers among the unique U.S. capabilities,
although a Democratic administration would likely continue President Obama’s policy of
including these supporting role ground forces as well.
There is a clear policy difference between Democrat and Republican candidates
regarding the employment of U.S. ground forces to defeat Daesh (ISIS) and to confront
challengers in other theaters. The Democratic candidates resist the notion of additional
"boots-on-the-ground," thereby promoting stability through proxies without “miring our
troops in another misguided ground war.”3 Republican candidates call for U.S. ground
troops, especially to defeat Daesh and to block Russia from her aspirations in Eastern
Europe. Donald Trump indicated he would employ U.S. ground forces to secure oil fields
that Daesh can exploit – presumably as a first option.
The alignment of candidate positions on foreign policy and military missions offers
predictability to Army leaders on two fronts. First, a Republican candidate will likely try
to increase defense budgets, and a Democratic candidate will likely support continued
sequestration limits. However, Army end strength is unlikely to increase regardless of the
election outcome.
Second, consensus limits the number of challenges that candidates can expect military
planners to prepare for and narrows their preferred "ways" to confront those challenges.
Everybody wants to defeat ISIS and the prevailing means in both parties is reliant on a
regional Sunni force bearing the ground fight burden. All candidates are concerned with
nuclear proliferation and possible rogue behavior by North Korea and Iran. Beyond
traditional deterrence, candidates differ on approaches to confront these challenges; but
no candidate is advocating a direct military response. Finally, the candidates would like
to build U.S. and partner nation military capabilities to respond to Russian designs for
Eastern Europe and Chinese assertiveness in Asia. The general alignment of these policy
positions significantly narrows the military planning aperture and narrows the focus of
Army senior leaders toward that of combat readiness.
Political candidates have not addressed four key issues that should concern military
leaders. They all stem from the idea that challengers and partners get a say in setting
conditions that will motivate and limit the range of U.S. options. The first issue involves
"soft power" produced outcomes achieved by strengthening alliances, nurturing
relationships, and building military capacity among partners. The candidates have not
provided insight into the military’s role in supporting diplomacy, partner engagement,
and relationship networking to achieve these "soft power" goals. Second, no candidate has
laid out a plan for dealing with China in the "Gray Zone,"– that coercive competitive
space short of sustained conflict. Russia and China have both threatened U.S. national
interests without exceeding a threshold for direct military action. Short of precipitating a
fight, China is currently advancing its interests at the expense of the United States in this

competitive space. Third, no political or military leader is anxious to engage in a regime
change operation any time soon. Yet, from a military perspective, the leadership vacuum
in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen and a host of other states around the globe present the same
challenges. As conditions in those states directly or indirectly affect the American people
or their interests, the military must be prepared to act. Finally, partners might not be
willing or able to accommodate the burden the candidates expect of them without
significant U.S. ground force involvement. Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster cautions
that the primary reliance by the United States "on proxies is often problematic due to
variations in capability and the impact of incongruous interests on each party’s
willingness to act.”4 Limited warfighting capabilities, misaligned interests, and differing
degrees of commitment may confound each candidate’s vision of dealing with future
challenges without U.S. ground forces. In addition, some new partners lack the training
or inclination to employ their forces (to fight or manage the peace) in ways that conform
to U.S. sensibilities and ethical norms.
History and the vagaries of campaign rhetoric caution against making predictions as to
how a candidate, once president, will employ U.S. military forces around the world –
regardless of what they proffer during the campaign. Yet two insights seem clear. First,
the near single-minded focus of the Army’s leadership to maintain current force combat
readiness despite declining budgets seems well placed. Second, as an institution, the
Army must put some time and energy into examining how to win in contested security
environments that do not resemble historic, state-centric, warfare – for it is likely that the
Army will find itself engaged in those contested environments in the near future.
Developing relationship networks, assuring partners through engagement, and finding
ways to compete in the "Gray Zone" between peace and war are as important to advancing
U.S. interests as sustaining the Army’s capacity to fight and win the nation’s wars.
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